2007年9月から2008年6月にかけて、私は早稲田大学の交換留学プログラムを利用してUniverisity of Oregon (USA) に留学しました。以下に、帰国報告としてエッセイの形でまとめると同時に、アメリカ外交の授業で書いたレポートをペーストしました。 また、今後留学を考えている後輩にとっては、私の経験が少しでも参考や勇気づけになればうれしいです。 |
Life in Eugene「まだ勉強してるの?飽きないのね。《一杯目のエスプレッソがなくなったから、今度は緑茶を淹れようと 夜中のキッチンに立った時だった。ひとつ部屋のドアが開いて、モニカの顔が覗いた。私は小声で、 「今ノッてきたところだからやめられなくて。起こしたならごめん。《 と言った。モニカは、お茶じゃなくてビールにしたら?とけしかけてきたが(Bad girl!)、結局 ジンジャーティーを淹れてくれた。 私たちは、キッチン・バスルーム共用のquad式のアパートで一緒に暮らす仲間だ。 他のメンバーは、週6日Taco Bellで働いているロック好きのマイケルと、体型維持のために無脂肪食品ばかりを買いだめしてくるオリビアさん。 私と同い年のモニカは仏語専攻の4年生で、ネイティブアメリカンのボーイフレンドとはとても仲良しだ。 オレゴン州ユージーン市での生活は、まずこのアパートの賃貸契約から始まった。もちろん、海外での賃貸契約は初めて。 真夏に20kgはある特大スーツケースを引きずって、上動産屋をまわった。一週間後、やっと部屋が決まった。 新しい部屋に入ると、外とは対照的に空気がひんやりしていることにほっとして、どっと疲れが押し寄せてきた。 硬いカーペットの上だったが、丸二日間眠り続けた。 ![]() ![]() 家賃月額$275~のおんぼろアパート! 住人はUniversity of Oregonの学生が 多い。 大学の門まで徒歩10分のロケーション。 9月下旬、オレゴン大学3年生としての新学期がいよいよ始まった。 専攻は政治学。 クラスでは留学生だからといって、大目に見てくれることはほとんどない。 どれだけ高いGPAを維持できるかに必死になるアメリカの学生のなかで、私も生き残らなければならない。 中間・期末試験、レポートの平均点はどれも80点台は当たり前。たとえ89点でも驚く点数ではない。 文章は論理的でわかりやすいかどうかに加え、個々の意見が求められた場合には、 どれだけ独創的で面白く、皆と違う視点で書かれているかによって評価される。 そしてもっと大切なのは、学ぶことに意欲的であること。 このような環境に飛び込み、私はよく学んだ。そのためにここに来たのだ。 夜、ベッドに寝転んで目を閉じても、頭の中でさっきまで読んでいたテキストの文章が流れ、 寝たのか寝てないのかわからないまま朝が来る。食事は毎食、本を読みながらだ。 図書館に籠る日々もあった(真夜中でも学生がたくさん残っている)。 こんな毎日だったが、私に とっては必要な期間だった。だから続けた。そして何より、最高に楽しかった。 ある日、国際関係学のラース教授のオフィスアワーに質問に行くと、帰り際に教授はこう言った。 「Haruka、最終的には自分の答えを見つけることだ。学んだことから自分の答えを築き上げること、それがカレッジ教育だ《。 我が上沼先生も、同様のことを言われる。 そう、私は私の答えを見つけるために今まで勉強してきた。 だが今思うことは、自分の中にインプットすることはたくさんあっても、それを総動員したアウトプットができただろうか、ということ。 あまり自信がない。それが大学4年間の最大の反省点でもある。 また、私は時間を上手に使ってオレゴンでの生活を楽しんだ。 週末になると、友達と地元のレストランやカフェに行くのがお決まりで、 いろんな国の料理に挑戦した。 おいしい野菜が手に入る朝市や、たった2ドルでワインの試飲会にも出かけた。 (初めてヘビメタライブも経験した。魂が吸い取られる気がして、泣いて帰った!) 感謝祭、クリスマス、イースターなどのイベントも楽しんだ。 Amtrakでポートランドや時にはシアトルまで足を伸ばし、ショッピングをするのも最高の息抜きだった。 さらに、ジョギングを日課にしていた私は、夕暮れ時の大学トラックの常連だった。 ![]() ←このトラックで北京五輪の陸上全米代表が直前合宿をしたそうだ。 代表団は私の帰国と入れ違いでユージーン入り。 そうでなかったら、彼らと並んで走れたかもしれないのに…? 加えて、大統領選挙の予備選挙と同時期の留学は、大統領選挙過程を肌で学ぶことができ、ラッキーだった。 まず、授業中に有権者登録の紙が配られてくる。 選挙権行使のためには、有権者登録をしなければならないというシステムは、日本人の私には馴染みがなかった。 それから、選挙とマスメディアの関係についても考えさせられた。 例えばオレゴンの地元紙、Oregonianは民主党のオバマびいきで、 ヒラリーがユージーンに来た翌日の新聞でも彼女は三面記事扱いだった。 アメリカの新聞は、どの候補者を支持するか明確にする特徴がある。 オレゴン州は予備選挙の日程が全米で最後の方だったが、民主党の予備選挙が接戦になったことで熱狂は続いた。 ある友人は、「オバマが負けたら今夜はやけ酒だ!《と言って選挙に臨んだ。 この年の特徴を一言で言うとやはり、選挙だった。 だが、景気後退と食料品価格の高騰も忘れられない出来事だ。 2007年末になるとドル安が加速したが、歓迎ムードなのは私たち留学生だけ。 また、ベアー・スターンズ救済の問題はマスコミを騒がせた。 スーパーでは牛乳や卵、パンといった食料品が高くなったと実感した。 ユージーンの市バスでは解雇が相次いだり、路線が一部削減されるとローカル番組で流れた。 いよいよ、経済はまずいぞという雰囲気が市民のあいだに広がった。 私はこの上景気を見てきて、アメリカ型の大量生産・大量消費の時代が終わるのはそう遠い話でもないと感じた。 さて、私はいま日本の東京での日常に戻っている。Harris Houseはとっくに引き払った。 夜中2時に誰かがキッチンの明かりをつけ、オーブンでピザを焼く音に起こされることはもうないし、 私が朝6時に起きてコーヒーを淹れ、りんごをかじる爽快な音を立てても、 隣の部屋のオリビアさんが眉間に皺を寄せて寝返りをうつこともない。 それに、真上の部屋で友人ジェニーが大声で長電話している相手を予想することももうできない。 私はオレゴンでの日常を思い出すと、まだちょっとだけ寂しいが、そう思えてハッピーでもある。 ※DucksはUOのマスコット。ディズニー(Donald Duck)と契約している。 ![]() ![]() お別れの日にふさわしくない味だった。 ←ユージーンで一番おいしいと思う 「ペガサスピッツァ《。 Policy PaperPS 326 U.S. Foreign Policy IPaper Assignment: In 1969, Graham Allison outlined three explanations for the decisions made during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Now, thousands of original documents generated during the crisis are publicly available to researchers. Based on your research, do the documents support or negate any aspect of the bureaucratic politics or organizational process explanations? Your paper should assess a minimum of five documents, of your choosing, in light of Allison’s framework. Be sure to specifically explain how the documentary evidence relates to either the bureaucratic or organizational perspective. Good Luck! Haruka Kuwahara PS 326 U.S. Foreign Policy Dr. Karen Peters-Van Essen May 28, 2008 Nations are not monolithic actors in the international politics. Now many scholars and analysts are aware that it is impertinent to explain a nation’s decisions, regarding nations as black boxes, as Graham Allison did with rational policy model. Using the two alternative models; the organizational process and bureaucratic politics, Allison proved that a better understanding of foreign policy would require investigations into the internal organizations and political actors participating in the policy process. Foreign policy-making is conducted more dynamically by domestic actors who hold and affect government positions in the real scenes. In the case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison is committed to an inductive technique, and encouraged us to examine which framework could better explain the crisis. Based on oral history studies, this paper focuses on limits of the second model’s explanations and reinforcement of the third model in this case. From the perspective of the organizational process, actions are explained as organizational outputs. The actor is a constellation of semifeudal loosely allied organizations, each of which relies on a fixed set of standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to perform complex and specific routines. Also, since organizations are responsible, partly independent, each organization must know what its job is, or its jurisdiction from the beginning. Although the President and other government leaders rank as the top of the conglomerate, they cannot make any decisions without information and estimates arising from the organizations. Indeed, governmental control over organizational activity is almost impossible. The government’s decision, as a result, has to be the sum of the organizational accumulated outputs. Significantly, information and estimates are usually biased through the organizational filters in the process of reaching to the top, but the second model implies that the leaders rely on the sources at best. Also, once these SOPs are established based upon past experiences and examples, they are rarely changeable. This means that organizational behavior can be occasionally inefficient and sluggish. Because the organizational behavior has been rigidly formalized under SOPs the organizational process entails narrowing governmental choices. Suppose the second model were explainable for the Cuban Missile Crisis, a series of actions would be the outputs of organizational process involving certainty. However, oral history interviews with three members of ExCom; McCone, Taylor and Sorensen attenuate the second model’s persuasion. Before an analysis of original documents, a short note on the significance of oral history. Oral history is the research method of historical documentation by recording the memories of people. While historians have referred to official documents, other historical materials and literatures in their research, these documents and materials do not necessarily contain full of information that historians want to know. For instance, the decision-making processes were not recorded in many cases. So, it often results in a limit of the full content analysis. On the other hand, oral history applies traditional verbal forms of communication as a grandmother tells her grandchildren, and is especially suited to record how decision-makers have felt and acted in a certain moment or in the course of taking actions. In his interview by Joe B. Frantz, McCone gave a considerable response on the CIA’s situation during the crisis. He said that the CIA was not in an independent situation which enabled it to make its own policy. He also said that the CIA coordinated with the White House, the State Department and Defense Department in all operational matters. It directly means that the CIA acted together with the administration and there was no output of the CIA alone. Also, McCone witnessed and insisted in the summer of 1962 that the offensive missiles were being set up in Cuba, but a majority of the National Security Council would not believe his view. The discovery of the missiles was delayed not only because of disbelief, but also of a jurisdictional issue between the CIA and the air force. As Allison also mentioned, the second model’s account is not enough as to the delayed discovery because the process of the “discovery” cannot be under the established routines. Therefore, the interview of McCone weakens the organizational process explanations. Interview with General Taylor also attenuates possibilities for the organizational process explanations. Taylor thought the air strike wouldn’t suffice and favored a more severe option; invasion of Cuba, though he took the final decision loyally in the end. The military could not go forward its recommending plan because most of the leaders including President Kennedy did not supported invasion. Defeat of the invasion plan cannot be accounted for in the second model’s terms. Moreover, Taylor said, “I was not aware of the fact the President had discussed with the State the desirability of getting the missiles out of Turkey…” Without informing it of the military, probably, on purpose, the government decided to disarm the missiles in Turkey. The course of the decision-making was a top-down form, so the top, especially President Kennedy played a crucial role in disarming. Thus, the consequence cannot be organizational outputs. For these reasons, the interview with Taylor does not support the organizational process accounts. In the interview with him by Carl Kaysen, Sorensen described the process in making the final decision as the following; “There was a good deal of shifting back and forth. Probably everyone there changed his view at least once during that week.” Although they soon abandoned four options; “do nothing”, diplomatic pressures, a secret approach to Castro and invasion, the ExCom wavered on which to choose, a surgical air strike or a blockade. Sorensen told that almost everyone’s initial choice was surgical strike, but the more they examined, the more it turned out to be almost impossible. Then they started to favor of the quarantine. If the final decision were described with the second model, we could not observe the fact of shifting back and forth in the process. The course has to be from organizations to the top to its action. Therefore, the second model’s description is also contradictory to the interview of Sorensen. The three interviews above demonstrate that the case of Cuban Missile Crisis cannot be accounted for in the organizational process terms. In short, all of three documents negate its explanations. Next, the bureaucratic politics emphasis on actions as outcomes of bargaining games among individual players within the organization. First of all, the actor is not a conglomerate of organizations, but a number of individuals who have different perceptions, interests and priorities, according to their positions. The famous term “where you stand depends on where you sit” gives the explanation of why a player has made a particular resolution. As Allison wrote, another explanation is possible by observing the player’s personality. Thus, a player’s standing is predictable to some extent in many cases. Moreover, which players enter into the games depends on the degree of the responsiveness to certain issues. Then, the players share power. The President is an influential actor, but he is not a dominant figure in policy making. Struggles, infighting and bargaining among the players of the various subunits determine decisions. Consequently, the decisions are not a consequent set of national goals and objectives like those of the first model, but rather, importantly, the decisions are the unintended consequences of a bargaining process in which parochial interests dominate. What if the third model explains the Cuban Missile Crisis? This model provides more persuasive explanation of why the ExCom chose the blockade of Cuba. The blockade was the outcome of bargaining game among the U.S. leaders. In interview with Dean Acheson by Lucius Battle, Acheson recalled the discussion in the ExCom. It is the very bargaining game. In his words, “…two things began to happen—one was that the different views became closer together, and the other was that some people intervened to make the situations much more difficult by making rather foolish proposals.” Clearly Acheson meant that “some people” were the military who suggested invasion of Cuba, and he described the nature of the military as following; “they want to go further and further in a military way…. They cannot satisfy themselves by doing something but not everything.” The military’s stance is exemplified in its nature and desire to expand its jurisdiction. Also, Acheson himself showed his stance, that is, out-of-discussion. Since he was not in a responsible position, he thought the planning was too important and serious for him. After all, he had a secret mission of meeting with General DeGaulle in France and helped President Kennedy within what he was asked to do. Interestingly, such his action seemed to be linked with his belief as well. As Acheson wrote in his book, Power & Diplomacy, he argued that U.S. foreign policy was not a matter of rewards and punishments, but a matter of influential and collective ways to do what is the desirable thing. Although Allison did not delve into effects of a player’s personality in the bureaucratic politics, Acheson’s action associated with his personal standing is proper to explain with the third framework. For these reasons, interview with Acheson reinforces the bureaucratic politics account. During the interview, Earle Wheeler, the Joint Chief of Staff of Army, believed that he played his role in the crisis. Now, his stance is predictable enough to say invasion of Cuba. It is right. However, the plan of invasion was abandoned in the bargaining game. The bureaucratic politics is good at accounting for this process of bargaining as following; Wheeler had worried about shortage of airlift and old-fashioned equipments, and he also admitted that the President became skeptical about the operational ways and responsiveness of the military. So, the military finally went over to the presidential decision as a body, and then increased the military capabilities and regained the presidential trust in the military force, in return. Wheeler seemed proud that after the crisis the President became friendlier and more appreciative toward the military, and also said, “…he[John F. Kennedy] recognized more clearly than ever before that military were perhaps the one element that he could depend on under any circumstance that might face this country.” The above is best described as the consequence of the military’s compromise in bureaucratic politics. Therefore, the interview with Wheeler strengthens the third model. The interview with Sorensen also reinforces the third model explanations. Explaining each player’s standing, Sorensen described the process of bureaucratic politics. First McNamara played a role in convincing McCone to go along with the blockade point of view. Second Bundy urged that they did not overlook the justification of no action at all. Third, President Kennedy tended to favor the blockade but reserved decision. Fourth, the Joint Chiefs were for all-out action, leading to invasion. Finally, the President found a surgical strike impossible and made a final decision. Although the President decided the blockade, this does not mean that he held control of the ExCom. He listened to his advisers and believed estimation of the risks in case of surgical airstrike. Moreover, according to Sorensen, President Kennedy said that those who thought the quarantine was most peaceful and less dangerous were about to be proven wrong when Russian ships were approaching toward the quarantine barrier. It shows that the blockade was neither rational nor value-maximizing decision. The actual decision was made as a result of many discussions, indeed, a result of conflicting and compromising with different opinions and interests. Hence, the interview with Sorensen is supporting the third model. In summary, oral history interviews with Acheson, Wheeler and Sorensen strengthen the bureaucratic politics explanations, and from this research I observe that the third model better explains the case of Cuban Missile Crisis. Frantz, Joe B., and McCone, John A., “Interview of John McCone by Joe B. Frantz,” oral history,19 August 1970, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and ProQuest, 2008), no. 03254. Neustadt, Richard E., and Taylor, Maxwell D., “Interview with General Maxwell Taylor,” oral history, 28 June 1983, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and ProQuest, 2008), no. 03310. Kaysen, Carl, and Sorensen, Theodore C., “Oral History Interview with Theodore C. Sorensen by Carl Kaysen,” 26 March 1964, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and ProQuest, 2008), no. 03194. Battle, Lucius D, and Acheson, Dean G., “Interview with Dean Acheson by Lucius D. Battle: Excerpt on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” oral history, 27 April 1964, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and ProQuest, 2008),no. 03197. Clifton, Chester V., and Wheeler, Earle G., “Oral History Interview with Earle Wheeler,” oral history, 1964, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and ProQuest, 2008), no. 03185 Allison, Graham T., “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Review, 63, no.3, 1969. Quoted in John G. Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 5th ed. (Pearson Education, Inc, 2005), 402-46 Comment: Haruka, This is a good paper. It is organized well, but some places could need more development. However, overall you're done a good job isolating your argument and analysing the documents ―especially in tying them to the models. 96 -Don |